Scholars have consistently shown that social identities can influence political attitudes and behaviors; this paper explores the reverse relationship. Are partisan identities ever strong enough to influence involvement with a politically relevant social group? Looking at an identity that has become an increasingly strong predictor of partisanship and vote choice, religion, the paper develops and tests a theory that politics can influence a partisan's religiosity at a certain time in his or her life. An experiment and two panel studies show that when people are in the process of raising children-a time that encourages many to make decisions associated with their religious identities-their partisanship can influence these religious choices. The findings highlight partisanship's ability to influence key aspects of partisans' social identities and, ultimately, the religious makeup of the United States. * For comments, suggestions, and feedback, I thank
Identifying with certain social groups and interacting with other group members-whether racial, ethnic, or religious-has been shown to influence group members' attitudes and create politically relevant social cleavages (Conover 1988; Miller et al. 1981) ; however, scant attention has been paid to understanding how these group attachments form, why the strength of group identities varies, or what explains differences in group involvement (Huddy 2011) .
American politics scholars often ignore these questions because they assume that decisions associated with social group attachments take root outside of politics. But, what if politics plays a role in shaping parts of an individual's social identity?
This paper focuses on religion to address this possibility. Religion is not only an identity frequently touted as a primary determinant of political attitudes in the United States (Green 2010; Kellstedt et al. 2007; Layman 2001; 1997; Leege et al. 2002; Olson and Green 2006; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Smidt et al. 2010 ), but the relationship between religion and politics has also changed dramatically over the past four decades. Beginning in the 1970s, partisan elites began diverging along religious and moral lines, with voters soon following suit (Hartman 2015; Layman 2001; Putnam and Campbell 2010) . This transition weakened denominational differences across the parties and created new partisan coalitions based on religiosity, or level of religious involvement (Guth et al. 2006; Kohut et al. 2000; Layman 2001 ). Today, Republicans, on average, attend church with greater regularity than Democrats, whereas Democrats are more likely to eschew a religious identification altogether relative to Republicans (Layman 2001; 1997; Leege et al. 2002) .
1 Researchers have undoubtedly uncovered an important relationship, but is it evidence of religion's influence on politics, as many have assumed? The next sections describe a theory and present evidence that the strong association between religiosity and partisanship comes about, in part, because partisans adopt their party's religious stances as their own.
This paper makes four contributions. First, the theory encourages scholars to carefully consider how social identities develop and whether the resultant identities are, in fact, exoge-
A life-cycle theory of religion and politics
Claiming that politics and partisanship can affect religiosity requires that partisan identities be strong or salient enough to impact religious decisions. It is unlikely that this assumption holds true for all people at all times, leaving us to consider when partisan identities may influence religious choices. The sections below, which consider the religious and political socialization literatures together, develop a theory aimed at understanding just that.
The religious life cycle
A first step in understanding how partisanship can influence religious decisions relies on the religious socialization literature, which shows how people's relationships with religionmarked by membership and involvement in formal institutions-change as they develop and age. In particular, the "religious life cycle" theory, discussed by sociologists, developmental psychologists, and scholars of religion, argues that teenagers and young adults distance themselves from both the religion in which they were raised and religious practice in general (Arnett and Jensen 2002; Desmond, Morga, and Kikuchi 2010; Hunsberger and Brown 1984; Willits and Crider 1989; Wilson and Sherkat 1994) . Across multiple generations, young adults are the least likely to identify with a religious tradition, attend religious services, pray, and report religion being an important part of their lives (Smith 2009) , and decreases in religiosity occur across region of residence (Smith et al. 2002) , religious denomination (Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens 1993; Uecker, Regnerus, and Vaaler 2007) , relationship with parents (Smith 2009) , and parents' religiosities (Myers 1996; Petts 2009; Sharot, Ayalon, and Ben-Rafael 1986) .
Individuals must then decide whether to remain on the outskirts of religion or re-enter the religious realm upon reaching adulthood. Sociologists note that getting married (Hadaway and Roof 1988; Roof 1993; Sandomirsky and Wilson 1990 ) and having children (Arnett and Jensen 2002; Ingersoll-Dayton, Krause, and Morgan 2002; Wilson and Sherkat 1994; Wuthnow 2007 ) are strongly associated with increased church attendance, and that religious participation peaks when married couples have school-aged children (Argue, Johnson, and White 1999; Schleifer and Chaves 2017; Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, and Waite 1995) . While marriage and children are important impetuses for returning to the religious fold, becoming more religious is not a foregone conclusion. For some, the hiatus from religion in young adulthood becomes permanent (Roof 1993) . This life-cycle transition therefore does not represent a time when people will return to religion, but instead marks a time during which individuals are likely making decisions regarding their religious involvement. Moreover, decisions made during this time tend to be sticky. Although certain life events can move people away from or toward religion, religious identification and participation remain largely stable in adulthood (Dillon and Wink 2007) . The upper panel of Figure ? ? presents a visual illustration of the religious life-cycle model.
The political life cycle
A second step in understanding how partisanship affects religiosity relies on the political socialization literature, which explores how partisan identities develop. The "impressionable years" hypothesis claims-as the name suggests-that adolescents and young adults are highly "impressionable." During this time, outside influences and events shape long-term political outlooks, including partisan identification (Abramson 1979; Sears 1990; 1975) . Both parents' political leanings (Beck and Jennings 1991; 1975; Chaffee, McCleod, and Wackman 1973; Jennings and Niemi 1981; 1974; Niemi and Jennings 1991; Tedin 1974 ) as well as current events and the political climate of the day (Alwin, Cohen and Newcomb 1991; Beck 1974) can affect adolescents' and young adults' political views. The events affecting those coming of age can be large in scale, such as wars or scandals (Dinas 2013) , or regularly occurring campaigns and elections that boil down complex issues into simple, digestible ideas (Sears and Valentino 1997) .
The resultant partisanship from this socialization process is more than just a stable affiliation with a political party; it is a powerful identity that often lasts a lifetime (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) and influences other attitudes and behaviors. Partisanship shapes economic evaluations (Bartels 2002) , trust in the government (Keele 2005) , feelings about the fairness of elections (Sances and Stewart 2015) , and even consumption patterns and spending decisions (Gerber and Huber 2009) . The lower panel of Figure ? ? presents the political socialization timeline.
The two panels in Figure ? ? reveal that partisan identities have solidified and are stable by the time many people get married and have children. Partisans may then rely on elite cues when making religious decisions for themselves and their families. Once decisions surrounding religious involvement have been made, however, participation rates are quite stable.
Consequently, for those squarely in adulthood-that is, those who have already made their re-entrance (or not) into religion-partisanship's effect on religiosity should be muted. The two socialization literatures together offer generalized predictions as to when partisanship's influence on religiosity is most likely to be seen.
Religion and politics in American politics
Having identified when partisanship is most likely to influence religious behavior, the current political landscape generates specific expectations about how average partisans might behave. The Republican Party has aligned with organized religious groups and become associated with religious values, while the Democratic Party has been linked to morally liberal positions and less religious organizations over the past four decades (Bolce and De Maio 2014; 2002; Hartman 2015; Kaylor 2011; Layman 2001; Miller 2014; Smidt et al. 2010; Wilcox 1992) . In explaining the individual-level responses to these elite-level changes, schol-ars frequently assume that as religiosity became relevant to politics, religious voters became
Republicans and less religious and secular voters became Democrats. But the changing relationship between religion and politics at the elite level may have also encouraged partydriven changes in religious involvement. If so, Republicans would become more religious and Democrats would become less so over time.
3 The empirical expectations comport with previous research arguing that the current religious-political landscape influences Americans' religious identifications (Hout and Fsicher 2014; 2002; Putnam and Campbell 2010) and evangelicals' church attendance (Patrikios 2008 Analyses that include non-white Americans more accurately reflect the magnitude of religious change in the general population; however, the results are statistically and substantively similar when looking at the white subsample.
3 Perceiving religious differences between the parties and constituencies is an important scope condition of both a religiosity-driven explanation of political change and a partisan-driven explanation of religious change. Figure A1 and a discussion in the Online Appendix (Section A) show that Americans perceive religious differences between the parties. Moreover, selecting into specific religious communities or "church shopping"-an increasingly common occurrence and another potential form of partisan-driven religious change-allows individuals to sort into religious environments that match their political outlooks. Results looking at religiosity may therefore represent conservative estimates of partisanship's influence on religious decisions, as they do not account for the possibility of politically minded church shopping.
Partisan priming experiment
A priming experiment offers a first test of partisanship's potential influence. Priming an identity allows researchers to circumvent the problem that identities are not exogenous by instead measuring attitudes (Jackson 2011; Klar 2013) The two-wave experiment took place in August 2013 using a diverse national sample.
4
After asking partisanship in the first wave, the experimental portion took place two weeks later. Respondents fell into one of two randomly assigned groups at the beginning of the second wave. To prime partisan identities, treated respondents rated the aesthetics of three flyers advertising a voter registration and political engagement drive put on by the fictitious Ohio Voters' Council. Self-identified Democrats and Democratic leaners in wave 1 rated flyers for a Democratic event, while Republicans rated flyers for a Republican version of the event. Respondents rated the flyers in three head-to-head match ups, choosing which flyer was easier to read, which flyer made the event seem more attractive, and which flyer the respondent preferred overall. The experimental stimulus is a weak treatment; the flyers make no reference to specific policies, politicians, or groups. Instead, the experiment relies on respondents linking politics and religion in their own minds. After answering final questions about voter registration drives, respondents moved on to the next part of the study that asked a series of attitudinal and behavioral questions. The main dependent variable-religious 4 The sample was obtained through Survey Sampling International (SSI). SSI recruits potential participants online and invites them into the panel. SSI then randomly selects panel participants to take part in a particular survey. There are no quotas, but SSI recruits a target population that matches the (18 and over) census population on education, gender, age, geography, and income.
identity-was asked among other demographic questions later in the survey.
The dependent variable is a four-point measure of religious identification based on two questions. Respondents first answered a standard religious identification question and then one follow-up question based on their initial response. Those who identified with a religion were asked to report whether or not they identify strongly or not strongly with the stated religion. The roughly one-quarter of respondents who did not identify with any religion were asked: "Do you think of yourself as closer to one particular religion over another?" and were given the same response options as the initial identification question along with an option of not feeling any closer to one particular religion. The resultant four-point scale of religious identification ranges from 0 (strong non-identifier) to 1 (strong identifier).
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The analyses focus on two subsamples. First, individuals with school-aged children have, based on predictions from the life-cycle theory, religious attachments that are more likely to change. It is during this window, therefore, that politics' influence is most likely to be evident. Second, individuals with grown children are more likely to have already made religious decisions, which should make these parents more immune to political influence. 6 In contrast, religious identification rates remained relatively stable among those with grown children. The identification gap actually shrunk slightly, but this result is statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.42). A further test, presented in the Table B4 in the Online Appendix, shows that the experimental treatment effect differs between those with children at home and those with grown children (p-value = 0.02). Respondents at a specific life stage updated their reported religious identities to be "consistent" with their previously expressed partisan identities. The experimental design, however, cannot rule out that the two cohorts are simply different nor can it tell us how partisanship might affect religious engagement in the real world. The next sections present two sets of observational results that corroborate and build on the experimental findings.
Testing partisanship's influence using two panel studies
Scholars have identified several instances in which voters received clear signals distinguishing the parties on the basis of religiosity or morality politics. In other words, voters
were afforded the opportunity to update their religiosity, partisanship, or both. For two cases, one in the 1970s and one in the 2000s, there are data measuring both religious and political variables at multiple points in time. Although the sample compositions differ, the data are collected decades apart, and the political circumstances are distinct, the underlying empirical strategy is the same. Both cases test whether partisanship-measured years beforecorresponds with changing levels of attendance at religious services, generally referred to as church attendance.
1970s: The beginning of elite divergence
Religion's role in politics as well as its association with the political parties changed in the 1970s. First, new issues, sometimes described as morality politics, created a substantively different political dimension on which the parties could differentiate themselves. Debates and discussions about legal protections for gays and lesbians, women's equality, abortion access, and marijuana legalization (MacCoun et al. 1993; McBride and Parry 2016; Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996) changed the types of relevant considerations available to Americans making both religious and political decisions. Second, large-scale religious organizations provided a national platform to religious conservatives for the first time (Jelen 1993; Lassiter 2008) (Hartman 2015; Layman 2001; Oldfield 1996) ; politicians discussing religious faith and applying religious teachings to policy positions (Domke and Coe 2008; Kaylor 2011; Smidt et al. 2010) ; and the party platforms slowly taking firmer, and opposing, positions on social issues, such as abortion. Together these changes constitute a reshaping of how religion and religiously tinged policy issues were addressed in the political sphere and set the stage for average Americans to respond by updating their political attachments, religious attachments, or both.
Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study
The Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study (YPSP) can track partisans' levels of church attendance as they transition from one life-cycle window to another. (Newport 1979; Smith 2009), religious upbringing (Carroll and Roof 1993; Myers 1996; Sharot, Ayalon, and Ben-Rafael 1986) , and family dynamics (Myers 1996; Wilson and Sherkat 1994) . Although the data have limits and cannot rule out every alternative explanation, they are well suited to test the life-cycle theory. Table C4 .
1965-1973: Young adults fall away from religion
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Changes in church attendance can be interpreted in two ways. First, changes in church attendance can represent real changes in partisans' behaviors. This interpretation, however, poses a problem if people cannot accurately recall their behaviors when asked (Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski, 2000) or respond with their "ideal self" rather than their "actual self" in mind (Brenner 2011) . To accommodate this issue, a second interpretation is to think of reported church attendance as a subjective measure. In this case, reported church attendance indicates ideal levels of religious involvement or feelings of closeness to the religious community (Brenner 2011; Chaves 2011 ). This interpretation more broadly reflects partisans' self-conception while also still being correlated with actual religious behavior. Although substantively distinct, both interpretations of church attendance capture how partisans feel toward and engage with the religious realm.
Further tests of the life-cycle theory and alternative explanations
What are the long-term consequences to the main findings presented above? Perhaps the partisan-produced religious gap is merely a temporary difference between Democrats and Republicans that closes over time. The gap that appears at this critical juncture, it turns out, remains for many years to come. By 1997, Democrats had not "caught up" with Republicans with respect to church attendance (third estimate of Figure ?? ).
Although the results comport with the life-cycle theory, partisans of all generations might have undergone similar changes. If so, a more appropriate interpretation would be that religious attachments are always open to political influence. The bottom estimate of Figure   ? ? presents replicated results using only data from the parent generation to assess whether this is the case. 13 In contrast to the over-time trends among the student cohort, there is results are unchanged in models that include and exclude these control variables. 12 Replicating the analyses excluding religious non-identifiers produces the same pattern of results. Although the results support the life-cycle theory, it is important to consider alternative explanations. Section C of the Online Appendix presents and discusses a series of plausible explanations that, if true, would undermine the life-cycle theory and main empirical results, including whether: partisans diverged in societal participation generally; the results appear because of Southern respondents; a shared genetic pathway explains both partisan identities and religious behaviors; different religious communities-and their corresponding participatory expectations-produce the results; selection bias is a concern, as some people are predisposed to both want children and return to religion; and individuals changing both religious identification, and policy attitudes. The main difference between the models using the parent and student data is that there are no measures of the parents' upbringings.
their partisan identities and levels of church attendance. There are, however, two alternative explanations that the YPSP data cannot address. First, this cohort may be unique and the results found above may not apply to other generations. Second, the results also comport with aging effects and are not specific to life-cycle transitions. To address these, the next section replicates the main findings using a different sample in a different generation experiencing a different shift in the political landscape. These policy events not only reminded voters that the parties differ along a cultural dimension but they also coincided with a dramatic shift in how journalists cover the relationship between religion and politics. Bolce and De Maio (2014) The empirical approach is similar to the previous results. Church attendance, which ranges between 0 (never attend) and 1 (attend weekly), acts as the main dependent variable while lagged partisanship and church attendance serve as the main independent variables.
2004: Moral issues claim the spotlight
The models include socio-demographic and attitudinal control variables that may influence both partisanship and change in religiosity across survey waves: race, age, age-squared, marital status, parental status, education, household income, employment status, region of residence, political ideology, religious identification, views of the economy, feelings toward gays and lesbians, feelings toward feminists, and attitudes on abortion and economic policy. The data again show that partisan attachments influence but are not being influenced by church attendance among those with children at home. 
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper does not dispute that identification and interactions with a social group can influence group members and even produce cohesive political blocs. Rather, one goal of this paper has been to think about the origins of these social groups and understand what causes variation in identity strength and group involvement. It does so by asking whether partisan loyalties can influence religiosity. A novel theory and two types of analytic strategies together show that once the parties and party elites were seen as distinct on questions related to religion and morality, Americans could draw on their partisanship when making religious decisions. The elite-level changes to positions and strategies not only affected how religious people came to view the parties, but also how partisans came to view religion.
The life-cycle theory builds on and contributes to previous research exploring politics' effects on religion in three ways (Djupe, Neiheisel, and Sokhey 2017; Hout and Fischer 2014; 2002; Patrikios 2013; Putnam and Campbell 2010) . First, the life-cycle theory offers an explanation for when politics is most likely to influence religion at the individual level,
abandoning the assumption that politics should have a uniform effect across different types of people. Second, the life-cycle theory grounds the rather surprising empirical finding that politics can affect religion in an intuitive theoretical framework. And third, the theory and empirics offer additional pathways explaining why Democrats are less religious than
Republicans. Research detailing how politics affects religious identification (Hout and Fischer 2014; 2002) and church attendance (Patrikios 2008) assume that politics pushes Democrats out of religion. While both the experimental and ANES data corroborate this claim, the YPSP data show that Democrats also end up being less religious than Republicans on account of returning to religion at a lower rate than Republicans. Moreover, the experimental results highlight that politics can bring Republicans deeper into the religious fold as well.
The experimental and panel data together show how the political environment can influence partisans' reported religiosities. Importantly, looking at strength of religious identity and church attendance as the two dependent variables might underestimate partisanship's influence on religious choices. For example, Putnam and Campbell (2010) argue that politics might affect religious switching or which religious community a person joins. As such, if a Democrat (Republican) chooses a liberal (conservative) religious community to join, he or she should have no problem being a strong religious identifier or attending church regularly.
And yet, these results appear despite partisans previously having had an opportunity to select into religious communities that reflect their political outlooks. Future research, including original surveys asking detailed questions about respondents' religious communities, can help uncover whether and how politics plays a role in deciding which congregations partisans decide to join.
The results offer an alternative explanation of how the God gap came to pass. Both scholars and journalists have written a great deal about the political differences among those with varying levels of church attendance. This paper shows that politics helps produce this gap on account of partisans selecting into (or out of) organized religion based on their partisan identities. By gaining a better understanding of how this religiosity gap in survey research formed, the results have the inherent limitation that they do not measure actual behavior. While these data do not tell us whether attendance at religious services changeda remaining question that is ripe for additional research-the findings indicate that, at the very least, partisans' subjective views toward organized religion diverged in response to the changing political environment.
In particular, the YPSP results put aggregate trends about religion and politics into perspective. Much of the research that links individual-level religiosity to political variables such as partisanship and vote choice do not see a strong relationship until the 1990s and onward (see Green 2010) . If religion and politics became noticeably intertwined in the 1970s, why did the correlation between religiosity and partisanship become stronger decades later? The YPSP data showed that partisans in the student cohort responded to the shifting political environment while their parents did not; however, the student cohort made up a small percentage of the electorate, limiting researchers' ability to detect shifts in the full population. Instead, as younger cohorts' relative size within the electorate increased, the correlation between individual-level religiosity and political measures also increased. Republicans becoming more active in organized religion and Democrats becoming less so, it is unsurprising that personal religiosity-however measured-is strongly associated with a host of political outcomes. Those who are most receptive to religious cues are also more likely to have opted into religion in the first place, whereas those least receptive to such cues are more likely to not be religiously involved. Researchers must therefore be cautious when designing studies aimed at understanding religion's influence on political outlooks.
Correlational results using cross-sectional regressions can accurately measure how religion affects political attitudes only if we assume that the religious explanatory variable is an "unmoved mover" (Campbell et al. 1960 ) -itself stable but affecting political dependent variables. Scholars interested in exploring the relationship between religious and political attitudes must therefore seriously consider religion's ability to be both an independent and dependent variable and whether religion can be considered as an "unmoved mover."
Finally, this paper also provides a broader lesson related to partisanship. Whereas party identification is often thought of as a consequence, rather than a cause, of social cleavages in American politics, this paper demonstrates the potential power of partisan identities to affect not only apolitical attitudes and behaviors, but also key aspects of an important social identity. The paper shows that partisan divides do not merely reflect social divisions, they help create these divisions as well. .7
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Respondents with grown children Note: Dependent variable is a four-point religious identification scale that ranges from 0 (strong nonidentifier) to 1 (strong identifier). Source: Priming partisanship experiment Note: The left panel presents partisan differences in changing levels of church attendance. Estimates come from change models that include lagged partisanship, lagged church attendance and control variables described in the text. Dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals. The right panel presents religious differences in changing levels of seven-point party identification (black circles and dashed 90% confidence intervals) and vote choice (gray boxes and solid 90% confidence intervals) between 1973 and 1982 based on church attendance in 1973. Each coefficient represents the difference between a particular level of church attendance and non-attenders, who serve as the reference category. Estimates come from change models that include lagged political dependent variables and control variables described in the text. Source: Youth-Parent Socialization Panel 
